Diary: 5/815/2007

Aleksanterinkatu 4

FIN-00100 Helsinki

Finland

August 30th 2007

Subject: environment assessment of Olkiluoto 4

First of all, any increase of the energy consumption is criminal regarding to climate change and finite fossil and nuclear ore, only renewable energy should be accepted as long term primary energy source. This is not the case of nuclear energy (for instance due to finite ore, oil consumption among other during mining, enrichment and transport).

Any money wasted in nuclear project can’t be used in more intelligent way of producing or saving energy, in that way it has negative impact on climate change.

From the first step (uranium mining), Olkiluoto 4 would pollute. Just see the claims made in France (radioactive particles found in rivers in the Limousin) and in Niger (radioactive dust transported by clouds): the builder of Olkiluoto 3 and possible builder of Olkiluoto 4 has proven that they are not able to manage uranium mining in a clean way.

After 50 years of use of nuclear energy, no definitive solution has been found for nuclear waste management. Putting nuclear waste underground (even under sea level!) near the current position of the sea cost in fragmented granite rock is one of the worst “solution” ever imagined. It’s definitive only in the sense that it can’t be retrieved. The fact that the searchers can’t imagine the consequences of creating a disposal has been shown in the research mine of Asse 2 in Germany: one year before 1988, they were still denying any possibility of water intrusion. Next year they can celebrate the 20^th anniversary of daily intrusion of 12 cubic meters of water. In Morsleben (as in Asee 2 as well) they’re filling the mines due to possible collapse. The last time tons of rocks felt down in Morsleben, it was not on nuclear waste. Can we expect to be lucky over thousands of years?

Since April 26th 1986, nobody pretends that a nuclear accident can’t append. Only France was “able” to prevent the nuclear cloud of Chernobyl to cross the border. That day, the equivalent of the STUK lost any credibility.

Nevertheless, the builder of Olkiluoto 3 pretends the EPR to be safe as an accident shouldn’t affect the environment. Just after Chernobyl, the way French government made the level of radioactivity stay under control has been shown: removal of a radiometer in Corsica that was over the admitted level. This, supposed to be defect, measurer has never been replaced.

This reactor should be safe due to two so called improvements: a core catcher… that would be efficient only on low pressure path – probability 3 % – and a catalyser.

Due to gravitation, core and water as well would reach the core catcher.

So we would have water in contact with core at more than 1,000 °C. That way the water would be split in oxygen and hydrogen under stochiometric condition, i.e. under ideal circumstances for a hydrogen explosion.

The catalyser, supposed to consume the hydrogen, due to the tremendous production of hydrogen could on the opposite initiate such an explosion.

After decanis of nuclear power plant running, the nuclear industry is still in try and catch mode. For such an industry, it’s criminal.

Let’s take a big player of the nuclear electricity production, Vattenfall. Like TVO it has a Scandinavian origin but has a much wider installed nuclear park. Expect if the STUK is much better than its equivalents SKI and BfS, we can expect a better crisis management in a reactor from Vattenfall than in Olkiluoto (it does not mean that the people in TVO are less good, just that they have less experience feedback).

Last year, Vattenfall lost electricity power in Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Forsmark (Sweden) during nearly half an hour, loosing any control on the nuclear reaction.

Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire

Fédération de 800 associations

9 rue Dumenge – 69004 LYON CEDEX

Tél. : 04 78 28 29 22

Fax : 04 72 07 70 04

Mél : andre.lariviere@sortirdunucleaire.fr

Site : http://www.sortirdunucleaire.fr/

Ministry of Trade and Industry

diary: 5/815/2007

Aleksanterinkatu 4

FIN-00100 Helsinki

Finland

This year they had to replace thousands of defect bolts. You may think that an inspection made by the STUK would

have been able to prevent such a bad usage, but the building of Olkiluoto 3 shows that the STUK did not see on time the usage

of porous concrete and did accept a gentlemen agreement where the defect concrete was not replaced.

Olkiluoto 3 is a good example of not under control building as the end of the building is postponed each year by a

year. It’s ridiculous but it’s about a nuclear plant!

Back to Vattenfall expertise. This year again, the NPP Krümmel (Germany) lost electricity power. This time it was

due to the brand in a power converter (incident 1), one of the consequences was the entrance of smoke in the control room

(incident 2), during the emergency stop a pump failed (incident 3), then a valve staid open (incident 4). Some incidents may be

never known as due to overwork, a computer could not protocol the events incident 5). Is it realistic to imagine that such

problems will never append in Olkiluoto? Can you be sure that in that case the people inside the control room will have the -

lethal! - idea of taking gas masks before the entrance of the smoke in the control room?

As person living in France I’m not authorised to forward you a classified document on the effects of 9/11 like terrorist

attacks on nuclear plants. The fact that the document is classified shows that the French NPP, among them the planned EPR,

would not stay such an attack. The 6 lines quoting the corresponding paragraph in an open letter of the Réseau “Sortir du

nucléaire” for the hearing on the possible NPP Flamanville 3 was censored. Nevertheless you can easily find the document on

internet. EDF states that the dangerous way of arriving with a passenger flight on a NPP (low landing) can be easily reached

for NPP on the see coast. So Olkiluoto 4 would “suit” the requirement for being attacked by an air plane. You may think

that Finland is not subject to terrorism. Can you be sure that it won’t be the case? In another Scandinavian country, who

thought Olof Palme would be killed?

Not only for those reasons, but for other like sustainable development, economic policy and so on, I suggest you strongly

to deny any authorisation on new building of NPP in Finland, especially on the coast.

For the network,

Jean-Yvon Landrac

Jean-Yvon.Landrac@SortirDuNucleaire.fr